For mutual goodwill
Increased people-to-people and youth exchanges could help reverse the slide in ties at a time people still believe that 'China-Japan relations are important'
According to a public opinion survey released by the Japanese Cabinet in February, the proportion of respondents who "felt close" to China in 2022 was 17.8 percent, down 2.8 percentage points from the year before.
About 28 percent of the 18-29 age group people "feel close" to China, followed by 23.7 percent of the 30-39 age group, and only 12.8 percent of 60-69 age group.
This indicates that young Japanese still have a relatively high liking for China. At the same time, the proportion of people who think "China-Japan ties are important" underwent a slight dip in 2022 compared to 2021, while still remaining high at 73.5 percent. This reflects Japanese people's complex feelings about China, that is, they believe that China-Japan relations are very important, but can't form a favorable impression for various reasons.
Japan's disposition toward China is closely related to the trend of China-Japan relations. In 1978, when the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed, the proportion of Japanese respondents who "felt close" and "didn't feel close" to China was 62.1 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively. During the "golden era" of their relations, Japan's favorable disposition toward China remained high.
After Japan illegally "purchased" China's Diaoyu Islands in 2012, the proportion of those "feeling close" to China decline significantly, reaching a low point of 14.8 percent in 2014 and 2016. There was a rebound thereafter, but it continued to decline after the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak.
Japanese people who have lived in China usually have a good impression of China, with the main reasons being the convenience of living there, the warmth and friendliness of the Chinese people and the good environment. However, the pandemic has hindered exchanges of people from all walks of life, leaving many Japanese people to mainly obtain information about China through the media.
Japanese public opinion on issues related to China has become increasingly hawkish, even showing rightist tendencies. Against the backdrop of intensified China-US competition and obstruction in China-Japan relations, although Japanese media reports on China included positive elements such as China's success in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and expectations for China's economy, they also sensationalized China's "tough diplomacy", their territorial disputes and the withdrawal of Japanese enterprises from China. They also overemphasized the risks brought about by the strategic competition between China and the United States, which has influenced the Japanese government's economic policies, leading to the public's negative perception of China.
Japanese think tanks have strengthened their perception of the "China threat", and regard China's rise as one of the greatest uncertainties in the current transformation of the international order. They have a significant impact on the government's diplomatic decisions and the shaping of public perceptions of China.
After World War II, relying on the US-dominated "liberal world order", Japan realized rapid economic growth and enjoyed long-term peace and security. That made it a supporter of the international order. Japanese think tanks thus accused China of trying to "rewrite" the regional and international order through the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
It is gratifying to note that the proportion of Japanese people who believe that "China-Japan relations are important" has remained high in recent years. This shows that the Japanese people share broad consensus on the importance of China-Japan relations, and they have a thorough understanding of the interdependence between the two countries in regional peace, economic and trade cooperation.
The growth of China's comprehensive strength has inevitably had a significant impact on both regional and international landscapes. In terms of economic and trade cooperation, China is not only Japan's largest trading partner, but also a market with huge purchasing power. According to data from the General Administration of Customs of China, the bilateral trade volume in 2021 amounted to $371.4 billion, up 17.1 percent year-on-year, hitting a record high since 2011.
Moreover, Japanese people aged 18-39 have a relatively high preference for China. Primarily this is because the young people have no prejudice against China. But middle-aged and elderly people tend to view the comprehensive strength of China and Japan as a relation of "as one falls, the other rises", and thus many are at a loss in the face of China's earthshaking changes. The young Japanese people, who have not experienced a period of rapid economic growth in their country, are more likely to accept a wealthy and powerful China.
Second, the diversification of information channels for young people in Japan does not rely solely on traditional media. On the one hand, as non-governmental exchanges between China and Japan deepen, they usually have direct contact with Chinese students or colleagues in schools or the workplace. On the other hand, China's smartphone brands, games, social media apps such as TikTok, and cosmetics have successfully tapped into the Japanese market and become popular with Japanese youth.
The deterioration of national sentiment is bound to further affect the direction of the Japanese government's policy toward China, leading to a further rightist and conservative trend in Japan's politics. In addition, it will affect Japanese investment in China. Thus, China and Japan need to work together to improve the mutual goodwill of their citizens.
First, China-Japan relations are facing opportunities, and the resumption of people-to-people exchanges provides favorable conditions for high-level engagement in the post-pandemic era. Both sides should try their best to manage and control various differences in the first half of the year, so that their relations are likely to warm up in the second half, creating a favorable atmosphere for commemorating the 45th anniversary of China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship this year.
Second, Chinese and Japanese experts should hold rational dialogues to effectively promote cooperation and exchanges between the two countries in various fields. Many Japanese experts urge China and Japan to strengthen cooperation in fields such as low birthrate and aging population, low-carbon environmental protection and the digital economy, reminding Japan not to misjudge the situation and mistakenly decouple from China.
Third, the two countries should boost youth exchanges. Different from sightseeing tourism, youth exchanges can develop genuine friendship. For example, after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Southwest China's Sichuan province, a Japanese high school student was concerned about the safety of a student from a high school whom he had previously communicated with in Sichuan. China can provide Japanese youth with concrete and perceptible Chinese cultural experiences through various thematic tours in different parts of China, such as tours featuring China's ecological civilization, tea culture, and the Three Kingdoms culture.
The author is an associate researcher of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.